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ABSTRACT: I give an account of the absurdity of Moorean beliefs of the omissive form 
(om)   p and I don’t believe that p, 
and the commissive form 
(com)   p and I believe that not-p, 
from which I extract a defi nition of Moorean absurdity. I then argue for an account of the 
absurdity of Moorean assertion. After neutralizing two objections to my whole account, I 
show that Roy Sorensen’s own account of the absurdity of his ‘iterated cases’ 
(om1)   p and I don’t believe that I believe that p, 
and 
(com1)  p and I believe that I believe that not-p, 
is unsatisfactory. I explain why it is less absurd to believe or assert (om1) or (com1) than to 
believe or assert (om) or (com) and show that despite appearances, subsequent iterations of 
(om1) or (com1) do not decrease the absurdity of believing or asserting them. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Suppose that I assert 
I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did. 
G. E. Moore famously observed that this would be “absurd”.1 Yet what I assert might be true; 
I may have simply forgotten my visit to the cinema. Moore calls it a “paradox” that the 
absurdity persists despite the fact that what I say about myself might be true.2 Moore did not 
notice that it is no less absurd of me to believe such a possible truth in silence. So the 
absurdity of the belief, as well as the assertion, needs explanation. Most people who are 
confronted with Moore’s example say that in some sense the speaker has contradicted herself, 
even after admitting that no contradiction lies in what is asserted. So a natural way of solving 
the paradox, in other words of explaining the absurdity, is to identify a contradiction-like 
phenomenon with something other than the content of that belief or assertion. 
Moore also observes that to say, “I believe that he has gone out, but he has not” would be 
likewise “absurd.”3 Unlike his first example, which has the omissive form 
(om) p and I don’t believe that p, 
this has the commissive form 
(com) p and I believe that not-p.4 
This semantic difference is inherited from the genuine difference between agnostics and 
atheists. The result is the difference between the specific omission of true belief and the 
specific commission of a mistake in belief. 
So any adequate account of Moorean absurdity must be able to explain the absurdity in both 
its omissive and commissive forms.5 Some past6 and recent accounts7 are inadequate in this 
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respect. Such an explanation would also have to identify other examples that share the 
paradigmatic absurdity of Moore’s own. Plausible candidates include 
I have no beliefs now, 
God knows that I am not a theist, 
and 
God knows that I am an atheist. 
If these really do share the essential features of Moore’s two examples, then any account of 
Moorean absurdity should generalise to them as well. 
Other candidates include Roy Sorensen’s examples in which belief operators are iterated, 
such as the omissive 
God exists but I don’t believe that I’m a theist 
and the commissive 
God exists but I believe that I’m an atheist 
These have the forms 
(om1) p and I don’t believe that I believe that p 
and 
(com1) p and I believe that I believe that not-p 
where the superscript denotes the order of iteration. 
Sorensen comments that as iteration increases, omissive absurdity appears to decrease, while 
commissive absurdity does not.8 Thus with four iterations  
(om4)  p and I don’t believe that I believe that I believe that I believe that I 
believe that p 
seems less absurd to believe or assert than (om1) whereas the absurdity of believing or 
asserting  
(com4)  p and I believe that I believe that I believe that I believe that I believe that 
not-p 
seems undiminished. And (om1) or (com1) seem less absurd to believe or assert than (om) or 
(com). What is the explanation of this? 
Here is how I will proceed. In §II, I give an account of the absurdity of Moorean belief. In 
§III, I use this to extract a definition of Moorean absurdity from Moore’s examples. In §IV, I 
apply my account to the other just-noted Moorean beliefs in order to explain their absurdity. 
In §V, I argue for an account of the absurdity of Moorean assertion. In §VI, I apply it to the 
other just-noted Moorean assertions. In §VII, I defend my whole account against two 
objections. In §VIII, I show that Sorensen’s own account of the absurdity of his ‘iterated 
cases’ is unsatisfactory. In §IX, I explain why it is less absurd to believe or assert (om1) or 
(com1) than to believe or assert (om) or (com). In §X and §XI, I show that despite 
appearances, subsequent iterations of (om1) or (com1) do not decrease the absurdity of 
believing or asserting them. 
 
II. THE ABSURDITY OF MOOREAN BELIEF 
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All commentators who explain the absurdity of Moorean belief appeal to the highly plausible 
principle that belief distributes over conjunction: 
If S believes that (p and q) then S believes that p and S believes that q.9 
We may add to this by calling on the other traditional components of knowledge besides 
belief—truth and justification—to produce a simple and original explanation of the absurdity. 
First consider Moore’s omissive example. If I believe that (p and I don’t believe that p), then 
since belief distributes over conjunction, I believe that p. But then my original belief is false 
since its second conjunct is false. My belief is not a belief in a necessary falsehood. Instead it 
is self-falsifying in the sense that although what I believe might be true of me, it cannot be 
true of me if I believe it. In other words, it is logically impossible for me hold a true belief in 
it. If I am at all reflective and rational then I am in a position to see, with a little reflection, 
that this is so.10 Since I am bound by the norm of avoiding forming false beliefs, I am 
irrational in holding the omissive belief. 
By contrast, I can hold a true belief in Moore’s commissive example, but only if I hold 
contradictory beliefs. Suppose that I believe that (p and I believe that not p). Since belief 
distributes over conjunction, again I believe that p. If my original belief is true, then so is its 
second conjunct, so I hold contradictory beliefs about whether p. To put it another way, my 
belief that (p and I believe that not-p), is true only if I both believe that p and believe that not-
p. So I may escape holding a self-falsifying belief only by holding contradictory beliefs. But 
a pair of contradictory beliefs cannot be justified, because any justification for my belief that 
p counts against my belief that not-p and conversely. I am in a position to work out that my 
belief escapes self-falsification at the price of contradictory beliefs, as we just did. Since I am 
also bound by the norm of forming beliefs only when they are justified, I am irrational in 
holding the commissive belief. 
 
 
III. DEFINING MOOREAN ABSURDITY 
We are now in position to extract a definition of Moorean belief from the commonalities of 
Moore’s two examples. Firstly, both are examples of possible truths. Just as I may have 
forgotten my visit to the cinema, so I may hold the mistaken belief that my friend has gone 
out. Secondly, if these possible truths are actually true then what follows is that I am not 
omniscient or that I am fallible. This itself amounts to no irrationality on my part. My 
forgetfulness no more impugns my rationality than the fact that good evidence leads me to 
mistakenly believe that my friend has gone out. Thirdly, we just saw in the last section that 
the omissive belief is self-falsifying simpliciter and that the commissive belief is self-
falsifying unless the believer holds contradictory beliefs. So in both cases, the belief is either 
self-falsifying or entails contradictory beliefs. Finally, we observed that the absurdity of such 
a belief arises from the fact that the believer is in a position to see that this is so with a little 
reflection. 
It seems plausible to think that combining these four essential features of Moore’s examples 
is sufficient for any other belief to be relevantly similar. This gives us the proposal that 
S’s belief that p is Moorean just in case 
(i) It is possible that p 
and 
(ii) The fact that p constitutes no irrationality in S 
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and 
(iii) S’s believing that p is either self-falsifying or entails contradictory beliefs 
and 
(iv) S is in a position to recognise (iii) with a little reflection. 
Support for this proposed definition comes from the fact that it makes intuitively correct 
exclusions. Condition (i) correctly excludes beliefs in self-contradictions such as 
It is raining and not raining 
from being Moorean. Condition (ii) excludes beliefs the content of which constitutes 
irrationality in the believer, such as 
It is raining but I believe that it is raining without the least justifi cation11 
from being Moorean, given that it is irrational to hold a belief in an ordinary matter of fact on 
no evidence.12 
Condition (iii) excludes beliefs that one might reasonably hold that are neither self-falsifying 
nor entail contradictory beliefs, such as 
I am asserting nothing now 
from being Moorean. After all, I could quietly believe in my continuing obedience to a 
Trappist vow of silence in a perfectly sensible way.13 Also excluded is 
At least one of my beliefs is false. 
This would be a perfectly reasonable belief in my own fallibility that is almost certainly true 
of me. It is clearly not self-falsifying, because coming to believe that I have at least one false 
belief hardly ensures that all of my beliefs are true. On the contrary, my belief is self-
verifying, in the sense that believing it makes it true. For if my belief that I have at least one 
false belief is itself false, then none of my beliefs is false. So all my beliefs are true, including 
my belief that I have at least one false belief. This means I have inconsistent beliefs, namely a 
set of beliefs that cannot all be true. But it also means that I cannot be mistaken in believing 
that at least one of my beliefs is false. Since I almost certainly have some false beliefs 
anyway, my belief that this is so represents a rational motive for finding out which beliefs 
they are, notably by looking again at the quality of evidence. 
The truth of my belief that I hold at least one false belief does not entail beliefs that contradict 
each other. Clearly I need not believe that all of my beliefs are true, for I can see that this 
would count as hubris. 
We must admit that if belief collects over conjunction then I would believe the “fat 
conjunction” of all my beliefs. But there are reasons to deny that belief does collect over 
conjunction. 
Firstly many, perhaps most, of the beliefs that I hold are unconscious, in the sense that I am 
not aware of holding them. Many of these unconscious beliefs are perceptual, and are in 
constant flux, in the sense that they come and go in step with changes in how things seem to 
me. Surely I cannot be aware of holding a belief that conjoins the contents of beliefs of which 
I am unaware. For example, in watching a sunset, my perceptual beliefs are changing rapidly. 
But I am normally unaware of a rapidly changing conjunctive belief about the sunset. I do not 
hold this conjunctive belief consciously. So I do not believe the fat conjunction of all my 
current beliefs consciously either. Can I hold the fat belief unconsciously? One reason for 
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answering negatively is the sheer size of the set of my beliefs, plus the plausible principle 
that belief requires the ability of thought: 
If S believes that p then S has the ability to think the thought that p.14 
This principle explains why although we may sensibly attribute coarse-grained rudimentary 
beliefs to a dog about the food in its bowl, we may not sensibly attribute to it the belief that it 
will be beaten in Lent. Clearly it lacks the ability to think thoughts of Lent. The principle also 
explains our difficulty in characterizing the beliefs of higher animals in any fi ne-grained 
way, since it is difficult to specify, using the linguistic expressions of our thoughts, exactly 
what thoughts are available to them.15 But although I am able to think the thought of the 
content of each of my present beliefs, I am surely unable to think the thought of the vast 
conjunction of these contents, simply because that thought is just too complex for me to 
think. In that case I could not even hold an unconscious belief of the conjunction of 
everything I now believe. 
Secondly, my beliefs appear to be so many that I cannot count them. To adapt Richard 
Foley’s example, while I am asleep in London you might truly say of me that I believe that I 
am a little under ten miles away from Nelson’s Column.16 In other words, I believe 
unconsciously that I live within ten miles of Nelson’s Column. I also believe, at least 
unconsciously, that I live within eleven miles of Nelson’s Column and I believe, at least 
unconsciously, that I live within twelve miles of Nelson’s Column . . . and so on. Foley thinks 
that this series is infinite. If he is correct then I cannot believe the conjunction of my separate 
beliefs about my proximity to Nelson’s Column, even unconsciously. For although I have the 
ability to think each thought in an infinite series, I surely do not have the ability to think the 
thought of their conjunction, for that would be a thought that I could never finish thinking. 
One might object that the series cannot be infinite because the content of a putative belief 
within in it will eventually contain a number so large (call it N) that just writing it down 
would not be achievable during a human lifetime. Since I cannot think thoughts of N, I cannot 
believe that I am within N miles of Nelson’s Column either.17 Assume for the sake of 
argument that this is true. Nonetheless, the principle that belief requires the ability of thought 
still prohibits the conjunctive belief. For my would-be thought that (I am within 10 miles of 
Nelson’s Column and I am within 11 miles of Nelson’s Column and . . . I am within N – 1 
miles of Nelson’s Column) will be significantly more complex than my thought that I am 
within N miles of Nelson’s Column. If the latter would-be thought is too complex for me to 
think then so is the former. 
Even if I did believe the fat conjunction of all my beliefs, this would not contradict my belief 
that I have at least one false belief, because it would remain logically possible (even if not 
true) that the fat conjunction does not exhaust all my beliefs. So my belief in the fat 
conjunction will contradict my belief that at least one of my beliefs is false, only if the fat 
conjunction includes the final conjunct “and these are all the beliefs I hold”. Surely none of 
us is able to believe this extra conjunct. We are in no position to list all the beliefs we hold. 
For one thing, we are unaware of holding many of them. For another, if Foley is correct then 
the list is infinite. 
So my belief that at least one of my beliefs is false is neither self-falsifying nor entails 
contradictory beliefs. So it is not Moorean. This is as it should be, since such a commitment 
to the necessity of at least one false belief is benign.18 Inconsistency in my beliefs need not 
undermine my justification in the way my self-contradictory or contradictory beliefs do. 
Justification for my belief that I hold at least one false belief, such as the fact that I have held 
false beliefs in the past, need not count against any particular one of the vast number of other 
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beliefs I now hold.19 Nor will justification for any particular one of these other beliefs, count 
in favor of my infallibility. 
 
IV. EXPLAINING THE ABSURDITY OF OTHER MOOREAN BELIEFS 
We may now apply this account to the other Moorean beliefs we considered in §I. As 
predicted by my definition, 
I have no beliefs 
intuitively shares the paradigmatic absurdity, despite the fact that it is not a belief in a 
conjunction. Its absurdity is easily explained. It is possible that I have no beliefs because I 
might be in a coma or in the first instant of my birth. To fail to hold any beliefs under these 
circumstances does not impugn my rationality since if I hold no beliefs then I hold no 
irrational beliefs either. But if I believe that I have no beliefs then what I believe is false. So 
my belief is self-falsifying. Since my belief is non-conjunctive, no appeal is needed to the 
principle that belief distributes over conjunction. 
Now suppose that I believe that 
God knows that I am not a theist. 
This might be true.20 If it is, then I am unenlightened but not necessarily irrational. To see 
that my belief is self-falsifying we must simply acknowledge the factivity of knowledge: 
If S knows that p then p. 
If my belief is true then since God’s knowledge is factive, I do not believe that God exists. 
But in believing that God knows that I am not a theist, I do believe that God exists. Since this 
is a flat contradiction, the content of my original belief cannot be true once I believe it. Once 
again my belief is self-falsifying. Now compare this last example with 
God knows that I am an atheist. 
Again this might be true. If it is, then the most that can be said of me is that I am misguided, 
not irrational. Since my belief in this is commissive, its absurdity should arise from a 
different source. Indeed it does. If my belief is true then since God’s knowledge is factive, I 
believe that God does not exist. But in believing that God knows that I am an atheist, I 
believe that God does exist. So my belief escapes self-falsification only if I hold 
contradictory beliefs about the existence of God. 
In each case I am in position to work the source of irrationality with a little reflection, as we 
just did. So I would be irrational in continuing to hold such beliefs. 
 
V. THE ABSURDITY OF MOOREAN ASSERTION 
Having defined Moorean belief, we might define Moorean assertion simply as 
S’s assertion that p is Moorean just in case S’s belief that p would be Moorean. 
Although this definition seems to capture the correct extension of Moorean assertions, it does 
not itself explain their absurdity. What will explain it? 
I will now argue that with a few harmless exceptions that I will deal with in §VII, whenever I 
make an assertion to you I try to make you believe me, or in other words, make you believe 
that I am sincerely telling you the truth. When my assertion is Moorean I am in a position to 
see that this attempt must fail. So while the absurdity of Moorean belief is an irrationality of 
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theorising, that of Moorean assertion is an irrationality of practice, in the sense that I am 
guilty of planning to achieve something I should see cannot succeed. 
There are many types of assertion.21 I may tell, inform or misinform you that p. I may let 
you know or tell you the lie that p. Or I may point out, confess, announce or contend to you 
that p. 
The cases of contending and lying show that it would be a mistake to explain the absurdity of 
my Moorean assertions in terms of my intention to impart my knowledge to you.22 In these 
cases my intentions are quite different. Yet as Thomas Baldwin points out, if you know that I 
am telling you a lie when I make a Moorean assertion to you, this will not expunge the 
absurdity.23 No other context of communication will obliterate it either, as Rosenthal notes.24 
For example, your knowledge that I’m reminding you, misinforming you, confessing to you 
or announcing to you, does not make the absurdity go away. 
Despite this difficulty we can nonetheless identify a set of common intentions that, with a few 
harmless exceptions, I have whenever I make any assertion.  
Before we identify this set of common intentions, let us forestall confusion by distinguishing 
between successfully making an assertion and making a successful assertion. I fail to make an 
assertion if I utter, “The pubs are still open” but am too drunk to articulate these words 
intelligibly. Nor do I succeed in making an assertion if I utter these words as an actor in a 
play, since all I attempt is to depict the assertion of a fictional guise. 
Having successfully made an assertion, that assertion may succeed or fail depending upon its 
point, in other words what change of mind I intend to bring about in you. For example, when 
I let you know that p, I fulfill my main intention of imparting my knowledge to you. When I 
contend to you that p, I aim to instill in you my belief that p. And when I lie to you that p, I 
nearly always intend to get you to acquire the false belief that p (I will deal with the 
exception in §VII). 
In any such case I intend to get you to believe my words. But I cannot succeed in this attempt 
unless I also get you to think that I am sincere in making the assertion. For if you think that 
I’m play-acting or recognize that I’m lying then you have no reason to accept my words, so 
my attempt to impart knowledge or lie to you will fail. Since I should see with minimal 
reflection that this is so, my full intention must be to get you to believe my words by getting 
you to think me sincere in uttering them. It follows that I must intend to get you to believe 
that I am sincerely telling the truth. 
In other words, I aim to make you believe me. Although our intuitions about what counts as 
“believing me” are not robust, there is reason to think that taking it to constitute believing that 
I am a sincere truth-teller is not just a convenient stipulation (although if it were, this would 
not affect my purposes). For if you don’t believe what I say then clearly you won’t believe 
me. Nor will you believe me, as opposed to merely believing what I say, if you accept the 
truth of what I say but know that I am merely parroting information or inadvertently telling 
the truth in an attempt to deceive you that has failed because I have got my facts wrong. 
I have just argued that I must intend to get you to believe that I am sincerely telling the truth 
whenever I try to let you know that p or tell you the lie that p. This must also be my intention 
when I misinform you that p, since misinforming is either lying or a failed attempt to inform. 
It must further be my intention when I point out or confess to you that p, since pointing out 
and confessing are both types of informing. 
When my assertion is Moorean, this aim is necessarily frustrated. It seems uncontroversial to 
endorse the principle that assertion distributes over conjunction: 
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If S asserts that (p and q) then S asserts that p and S asserts that q.25 
So if I tell you that (p and I believe that p) then I tell you that p. So in virtue of believing me 
sincere, you must think that I believe that p. I also tell you that I don’t believe that p. So in 
virtue of believing that I tell the truth, you must think that I don’t believe that p. So you must 
have contradictory beliefs if you believe me. In the commissive case, if I tell you that (p and I 
don’t believe that not-p) then since assertion distributes over conjunction, I tell you that p. So 
in virtue of believing me sincere, you must again think that I believe that p. But I also tell you 
that I believe that not-p. So in virtue of believing that I tell the truth, you must think that I 
believe that not-p. So this time you must think that I have contradictory beliefs. 
This itself is no obstacle to your believing me. Perhaps you are prepared to acquire 
contradictory beliefs or ascribe them to me. But when I attempt to communicate with you by 
making an assertion, I should assume that we would both charitably avoid such ascriptions if 
possible. On this assumption I am in position to see with minimal reflection that my plan to 
be believed, in other words to be thought a sincere truth-teller, is bound to fail. So it is 
practically irrational of me to go ahead and make the assertion. 
My account of the absurdity of Moorean assertion stands or falls independently of that of the 
absurdity of Moorean belief. This is less economical than an account of the absurdity of 
Moorean assertion in terms of that of Moorean belief. On the other hand a unified account 
might be too much to expect, given the different natures of belief and assertion.26 
Nevertheless the two accounts fi t together in two ways. Firstly, what you must believe if you 
are to believe me when I make a Moorean assertion is identical to what is the case if I hold a 
true belief in my own words. Secondly, since part of my aim in making a Moorean assertion 
is to convince you of my sincerity, in making a Moorean assertion I intend to make you 
attribute a Moorean belief to me, an attribution that I should see is a license to judge me 
irrational. 
 
VI. EXPLAINING THE ABSURDITY OF OTHER MOOREAN ASSERTIONS 
My analysis of the absurdity of Moorean assertion in terms of the speaker’s incredibility 
easily explains the absurdity of the other Moorean assertions. 
Suppose that you believe me when I tell you that I have no beliefs. In virtue of accepting my 
sincerity, you must believe that I have at least one belief, namely my belief in what I have 
told you. But in virtue of accepting the truth of what I say, you must also believe that I have 
no beliefs. So if you are to believe me then you must hold contradictory beliefs about my 
beliefs. 
Likewise, suppose that you believe me when I tell you that God knows that I am not a theist. 
In virtue of accepting my sincerity, you must believe that I do believe that God exists. But in 
virtue of accepting the truth of what I say, you must also believe that I do not believe that 
God exists. So if you are to believe me then you must hold contradictory beliefs about my 
religious convictions. 
Finally, suppose that you believe me when I tell you that God knows that I am an atheist. In 
virtue of accepting my sincerity, you must believe that I believe that God does exist. But in 
virtue of accepting the truth of what I say, you must also believe that I believe that God does 
not exist. So if you believe me this time, then you must think that I hold contradictory beliefs 
about the existence of God. 
Since I should assume that we are both minimally rational, I should see that in any of these 
cases, my plan to make you believe me is bound to fail. 
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VII. TWO OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES 
I now consider two objections that might be raised against my whole account of Moorean 
absurdity. 
The first objection is that there are three peculiar cases of assertion that do not fit the central 
account of assertion that I have given. The first case arises when I say something to you 
merely in order to “wind you up.” For example, suppose that I know that you think highly of 
Bush’s intelligence, an opinion I in fact share. Nonetheless I insincerely state that Bush is a 
moron in order to “rattle your cage.” Here my intention is to get you to believe that I am 
sincerely asserting a falsehood in order to keep you verbally opposed to my words. The 
second case is a double bluff. Learning that you have just discovered that I am a habitual liar, 
I decide to tell you the truth for once. So when you ask me if the pubs are still open, I tell you 
the truth that they are, in order to deceive you into mistakenly thinking that they are not.27 
Here my intention is to get you to believe that I am insincerely asserting a falsehood. The 
third case is a peculiar kind of lie. Suppose that you are interrogating me in the attempt to 
make me confess to a crime. I am well aware that you know that I am guilty and that I cannot 
convince you of my innocence. But I also know that without my confession, the court will not 
be able to convict me. So I rationally repeat the complacent assertion, “I’m innocent.”28 My 
lies are not attempts to make you believe that I am innocent but are merely stonewalling 
refusals to admit my guilt. 
In none of these three cases do I aim to make you think I am sincerely telling the truth. Since 
I have explained the absurdity of Moorean assertion in terms of the central account, the 
objection now arises that we may coin Moorean assertions of these three non-central types. 
Then the central account will not be able to explain the absurdity in terms of the assertor’s 
intention to be thought a sincere truth-teller. 
I reply that this is perfectly true. But my account of Moorean assertion still has the resources 
to explain the absurdity of “winding-up” or double bluff Moorean assertions as well as that of 
stonewalling Moorean lies. 
In the “winding-up” case, I can hardly hope to prolong verbal disagreement with you unless 
you think (mistakenly) that I’m sincere. But when my “winding up” assertion is Moorean, I 
am in position to see that you couldn’t take me to hold a Moorean belief unless you thought I 
was irrational. So although I could still irritate you by pretending to be mad, I could not 
sensibly try to annoy you by making you think that we are divided in opinion. 
In the second case, my intention in asserting that p is to get you to falsely believe that not-p. 
This means that I myself believe that p. But when my double bluff assertion is Moorean, I 
cannot rationally believe what I assert. 
Moreover, my attempt to make you think me insincere is parasitic upon my expectation that 
you will normally think me sincere. This is precisely why it is a double bluff. So the full 
description of such an assertion includes the fact that when I assert to you that p, I intend to 
get you to mistakenly believe that I’m insincere because I know that normally I will get you 
to think I am sincere. But when my double bluff assertion is Moorean, this is bound to fail, 
because there is no normal case in which I can sensibly try to make you think I hold a 
Moorean belief. 
A fuller description of the third case is that in telling you the lie that p, my intention is at least 
partly to let you know, in the knowledge that you know that p, that I will never admit that p. 
But when the stonewalling lie is Moorean, this means that I myself know that p. This is 
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impossible. Since I cannot rationally hold a Moorean belief, I cannot know its content either. 
So my intention cannot succeed. 
The second objection is that not all self-falsifying beliefs are absurd. So the fact that a 
Moorean belief is self-falsifying cannot explain its absurdity. In §IV, we noted the intuitive 
absurdity of believing or asserting that 
I have no beliefs. 
I then argued that this belief is irrational because it is self-falsifying, a fact that is easily 
discernible with a little reflection. In §V, I argued that the corresponding assertion is absurd 
because if I am charitable enough to assume that you will avoid acquiring contradictory 
beliefs then I am in a position to see that you will not believe me. 
But now suppose that Paul Churchland asserts that 
I have no beliefs (any more than I have vital spirits inside me). 
We hear no absurdity. Moreover, suppose that we think that eliminative materialism is false 
and that consequently Churchland really does believe that there are no beliefs. Then we 
would have to say that his second-order belief is self-falsifying. But we would not judge that 
Churchland is irrational in holding this belief.29 I reply that my account is not only consistent 
with this fact but also explains it. I agree that not all self-falsifying beliefs are absurd. I 
merely claim that it is irrational for someone to hold such belief if she is in a position to see, 
with a little reflection, that it is self-falsifying. When we first considered the example, we 
tacitly made the default assumption that it is believed or asserted by someone unlike 
Churchland, who thinks that there are such things as beliefs. Such a person is in a position to 
see with a little reflection that her belief is self-falsifying. By contrast, Churchland is not in 
this position. 
Suppose that we think that eliminative materialism is true. Then we must say that Churchland 
has no beliefs, self-falsifying or otherwise. On the other hand, suppose that we think that 
eliminative materialism is false. Then we must say that Churchland believes that he has no 
beliefs, although he doesn’t realise that he believes this. Churchland is certainly a minimally 
reflective and rational thinker. However, we know that he is committed to the claim that what 
we call “beliefs” no more exist than what we used to call “vital spirits.” We also know that 
refuting eliminative materialism will certainty take more than a little refl ection. So we know 
that Churchland is in no position to see, with a little reflection that he holds the belief that 
there are no beliefs and so is in no position to see, with a little reflection, that he holds a 
belief that is self-falsifying. In other words, condition (iv) of my proposed definition of 
Moorean belief is false. This explains why we will judge that Churchland is merely mistaken 
but not irrational. Although his belief is self-falsifying, it is not Moorean. 
My account also explains why we hear no absurdity in Churchland’s assertion. If he asserts 
that 
I have no beliefs (any more than I have vital spirits inside me) 
then we cannot charitably take him as intending to make us hold mental states that, from his 
point of view, do not exist. So we cannot take him as intending to make us acquire the belief 
that he has no beliefs. Likewise we cannot charitably take him as intending to make us 
attribute to him mental states that, from his point of view, do not exist. So we cannot take him 
as intending to make us attribute to him the belief that he has no beliefs. Churchland holds 
that the folk-psychological notion of belief will be replaced by a mental attitude to be 
elucidated by science. For convenience, call this attitude, “mental assent.” Then when 
Churchland asserts to us that there are no beliefs, we should not take him as intending to 
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make us believe that his assertion is true by making us believe that he believes that his 
assertion is true. Rather we should take him as intending that we mentally assent that he has 
no beliefs by also mentally assenting that he mentally assents that he has no beliefs. If 
Churchland’s intention is fulfilled, we neither hold contradictory beliefs nor contradictory 
attitudes of mental assent. So the fact that we will avoid ascriptions of irrationality when 
possible is no obstacle to the fulfillment of his intention. 
 
VIII. TWO PROBLEMS WITH SORENSEN’S ACCOUNT OF HIS ITERATED 
CASES 
We may now return to Sorensen’s claim that as iteration increases, omissive absurdity 
decreases, while commissive type absurdity does not. Using the notation “Bna~p”, where the 
superscript denotes the number of belief-operators (so that, for example, “B3ap” means that 
“a believes that she believes that she believes that p”) he writes 
My solution endorses the intuition that ‘p & Bn ~p’ is a Moorean sentence for all n, 
but ‘p & ~Bnp’ need not be a Moorean sentence when n is a large number. ‘p & 
Bna~p’ does not entail that a has a specifiable directly opposed belief. But ‘Ba(p & 
Bna~p)’ entails that a has directly opposed beliefs about p, under the assumption that 
a believes the consequences of his beliefs and that ‘p & Bna~p’ is true. This 
entailment follows directly for n = 1. When n > 1, the entailment is secured by a 
necessary condition for self-attributing higher-order beliefs.30 
The condition in question is a recursive application of the principle of belief-elimination: 
If S believes that she believes that p then S believes that p.31 
Sorensen appeals to this principle together with the principle that belief is closed under 
logical consequence: 
If q is a logical consequence of p and S believes that p then S believes that q. 
It follows that I cannot hold a true belief that (com1) p and I believe that I believe that not-p 
unless I hold contradictory, or ‘directly opposed’ beliefs about whether p. For if I believe that 
(p and I believe that I believe that not-p) then a logical consequence of what I believe is that 
p, so I believe that p. But if my belief in (com1) is true then I believe that I believe that not-p, 
in which case the principle of belief-elimination ensures that I believe that not-p. Since that 
principle may be applied recursively, the same diagnosis of the absurdity will hold for any 
order of iteration of the belief-operator, as in 
(com4)  p and I believe that I believe that I believe that I believe that I believe that 
not-p. 
It also applies to 
(com)        p and I believe that not-p 
in which case the principle of belief-elimination is not needed. Sorensen’s account diagnoses 
no such absurdity in 
(om1)        p and I don’t believe that I believe that p. 
For if I believe that (p and I don’t believe that I believe that p) then a logical consequence of 
what I believe is that p, so I believe that p. But if my belief in (om1) is true then I don’t 
believe that I believe that p, in which case the principle of belief-elimination fails to apply. 
But there are two problems with this account. Firstly, Sorensen must explain the absurdity of 
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(om)       p and I don’t believe that p 
as follows: If I believe that (p and I don’t believe that p) then a logical consequence of what I 
believe is that p, so I believe that p. But if my belief in (om) is true then I don’t believe that p. 
But this is not, as Sorensen supposes, a case of contradictory beliefs but rather a flat 
contradiction. 
Secondly, Sorensen’s appeal to the success of the principle that belief is closed under logical 
consequence is problematic. It is clear that it fails as a psychological principle. I may believe 
that a triangle is equilateral without believing that it is equiangular. Nor can it be true of me 
as a principle of ideal rationality. Suppose that I believe that Singapore is a democracy but 
have no idea what a plutocracy is. Then, as predicted by the principle that belief requires the 
ability of thought, I fail to believe that Singapore is either a democracy or a plutocracy. This 
failure may represent an indictment of my knowledge but hardly counts as a failure of 
theoretical rationality. 
Sorensen tries to circumvent this difficulty by making my “thorough obedience” to the 
principle that belief is closed under logical consequence a test of my degree of ideal 
rationality.32 This move is futile, because the failure of the principle would extend even to an 
ideally rational believer who has no idea what a plutocracy is. 
Moreover, although we should agree that degrees of rationality are vague, surely there is a 
difference between total obedience to Sorensen’s principle and none. So what is missing from 
Sorensen’s account is a principled place on this scale that is distinctive of the degree of 
Moorean irrationality.33 This means that Moorean absurdity cannot be explained in terms of 
failure of the principle. For if such failure is a form of theoretical irrationality at all, rather 
than a criticizable epistemic failing, it is a very mild form of irrationality. By contrast, a 
Moorean believer is guilty of a severe theoretical irrationality. 
 
IX. THE NON-MOOREAN ABSURDITY OF THE ITERATED CASES 
In fact, my definition of Moorean belief shows that 
(om1)   p and I don’t believe that I believe that p 
and 
(com1)  p and I believe that I believe that not-p 
are not Moorean beliefs at all. Admittedly, they are possible truths that do not impugn my 
rationality, thus satisfying conditions (i) and (ii) of the definition. As a case of (om1), suppose 
that I have no way of discovering the truth that it is raining because I have been incarcerated 
in a sealed room. I might reasonably withhold the belief that it is raining by suspending 
judgment on the matter either way. In so doing I need not mistakenly think that I believe it is 
raining. As a case of (com1), suppose that my captors fool me with the illusion of dry 
weather. I might be perfectly justified, not only in mistakenly believing that it is not raining, 
but also in recognizing this belief. So the truth of (com1) constitutes no irrationality in me 
either. 
But such beliefs fail condition (iii) of the definition. They are neither self-falsifying nor entail 
contradictory beliefs. If I hold a true belief in either, then since belief distributes over 
conjunction, I believe that p. But this does not contradict the second conjunct of (om1) 
namely that I don’t believe that I believe that p. Moreover the fact that I believe that p is 
consistent with the second conjunct of (com1), namely that I believe that I believe that not-p, 
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in a way that allows me to avoid holding a pair of contradictory beliefs. For my belief that I 
believe that not-p, may be mistaken. 
Nonetheless I do seem to be absurd in some sense to believe either. What is the explanation 
of this non-Moorean but related absurdity? 
The principle that belief distributes over conjunction helps explains the related absurdity as 
follows. In believing (om) or (com), I am not only guilty of the major fault that my belief is 
self-falsifying or entails contradictory beliefs but am guilty of a minor fault (of introspective 
non-omniscience or fallibility) as well. When the belief gets iterated, the major fault is 
expunged but the minor fault remains. 
The principle of belief-elimination is one half of the principle of introspective infallibility: 
If S believes that she believes that p then she believes that p 
and 
If S believes that she does not believe that p then she does not believe that p just as the 
converse of that principle is one half of the principle of introspective omniscience: 
If S believes that p then she believes that she believes that p 
and 
If S does not believe that p then she believes that she does not believe that p.34 
The failure of either constitutes an instance of mistaken belief or ignorance about one’s own 
beliefs. 
For example, my assertion that I don’t believe that women are inferior may be sincere 
because I am blind to the way I treat women. You may be in a better position to recognize 
that my boorish behavior is the manifestation of the existing belief that I believe I do not 
hold. In other words, I mistakenly believe I don’t hold a specific belief and so fail the second 
conjunct of the principle of introspective infallibility. 
In the same circumstances, you could also reasonably judge that I do not think that I hold the 
belief that women are inferior, although in fact I do hold it. This would be a case in which I 
hold a belief that I fail to recognize, and so fail the first conjunct of the principle of 
introspective omniscience. 
Since omniscience and infallibility are God-like qualities, such failures do not seem to be 
instances of irrationality. Suppose that I believe that we will lose a soccer match. It might be 
pragmatically rational for me to fail to believe that I hold this belief, because setting it aside 
might keep me from performing worse in the match. Nonetheless I am still open to epistemic 
criticism by the standards of introspection, given that introspection is normally an 
authoritative source of justification for beliefs about my mental states. However, such 
epistemic criticism seems minor in comparison with the irrationality of holding beliefs that 
are self-falsifying or that contradict each other. 
Since belief distributes over conjunction, if I believe that 
(om)  p and I don’t believe that p 
then I believe that p and I believe that I don’t believe that p. In other words, I mistakenly 
think I don’t hold a specific belief and so fail to be introspectively infallible. So I am guilty of 
the minor fault of being introspectively fallible as well as the major irrationality of holding a 
self-falsifying belief. By contrast, if I believe (om1) then the major irrationality is expunged 
but a minor fault remains. To see how the major irrationality disappears, suppose that I hold 
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the true belief that (p and I don’t believe that I believe that p). Since belief distributes over 
conjunction, I believe that p. But since the conjunction is true, I don’t believe that I believe 
that p. This is neither a flat contradiction nor a contradiction in belief. Rather I hold a belief 
that I fail to recognize. In other words, I may escape the major irrationality of holding a self-
falsifying belief by the minor fault of not being introspectively omniscient. Therefore I am 
less criticizable in believing (om1) than in believing (om). This vindicates our intuition that 
God exists but I do not believe that I am a theist  
seems less absurd to believe than 
God exists but I don’t believe that God exists. 
We may explain the decrease in absurdity of believing (com1) in parallel fashion. Since 
belief distributes over conjunction, if I believe that 
(com)  p and I believe that not-p 
then I believe that p but I believe that I believe that not-p. In other words, what I really 
believe contradicts what I think I believe. Unless I hold contradictory beliefs about whether p, 
I fail the first conjunct of the principle of introspective infallibility. Thus in believing (com), I 
am guilty of both the major irrationality of holding a self-falsifying belief and the minor fault 
of being introspectively fallible unless I am guilty of the major irrationality of holding 
contradictory beliefs. By contrast, if I believe (com1) then the major irrationality is expunged 
but a minor fault remains. For if I hold the true belief that (p and I believe that I believe that 
not-p) then I believe that p (since belief distributes over conjunction) but I believe that I 
believe that not-p (in virtue of the truth of the second conjunct of what I believe). This is 
neither a flat contradiction nor a contradiction in belief. Unless I hold contradictory beliefs 
about whether p, I fail the first conjunct of the principle of introspective infallibility. So I may 
escape both major irrationalities of holding a self-falsifying belief or holding contradictory 
beliefs by the minor fault of being introspectively fallible. Therefore I am less criticizable in 
believing (com1) than in believing (com). This vindicates our intuition that 
God exists but I believe that I am an atheist 
seems less absurd than 
God exists but I believe that God does not exist. 
It might be objected that a failure to be introspectively omniscient or infallible about really 
simple beliefs such as that 2 + 2 = 4 constitutes a major epistemic fault.35 There is justice in 
this complaint. It seems pathological to believe that 2 + 2 = 4 while thinking that one does not 
hold this belief. However this does not damage my explanation of the decrease in absurdity 
for the simple reason that two faults are always worse than either one alone, whatever their 
relative badness. 
My iterated assertions are less absurd than their original counterparts. When I assert (om) to 
you, you can only believe me by sacrificing your own rationality in acquiring contradictory 
beliefs. But when I assert (om1) to you, you can consistently judge that I have a specific 
belief that I fail to recognize. And the criticism you must make of me if you believe me when 
I assert (com), namely that I have contradictory beliefs, is severer than that you may 
charitably make when I assert (com1), namely that I hold a specific belief that contradicts 
what I think I believe. 
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X. WHY FURTHER ITERATION DOES NOT INCREASE ABSURDITY IN BELIEF 
We may now show that subsequent iterations of (om1) or (com1) do not decrease the 
absurdity in belief. If I hold the true belief that 
(om2)   p and I don’t believe that I believe that I believe that p 
then I believe that p (since belief distributes over conjunction) and I don’t believe that I 
believe that I believe that p (because the second conjunct of what I believe is true). But then I 
fail to be introspectively omniscient, since double application of the first conjunct of the 
principle of introspective omniscience to the fact that I believe that p results in the fl at 
contradiction that I both have and lack the belief that 
I believe that I believe that p. So I may escape the major criticism that I hold a self-falsifying 
belief by being guilty of the minor criticism that I am not introspectively omniscient. Since 
the first conjunct of the principle of introspective omniscience may be applied recursively, 
this result holds for any further iteration. So further iteration of (om1) does not decrease 
absurdity. For any iteration, the most charitable criticism to which I am vulnerable is that I 
am not introspectively omniscient. 
Likewise, if I hold the true belief that 
(com2)  p and I believe that I believe that I believe that not-p 
then I believe that p (since belief distributes over conjunction) and I believe that I believe that 
I believe that not-p (because the second conjunct of what I believe is true). In other words, 
my belief in (com2) avoids self-falsification only if I really have a belief that contradicts the 
belief that I think I believe I have. But for any iteration of (com1), I am guilty of the same 
failing, namely that I can hold beliefs all of which are true only if I hold contradictory beliefs. 
The truth of my nth-iterated belief that not-p entails the existence of my (n–1)-iterated belief 
that not-p, the truth of which entails the existence of my belief (n–2)-iterated belief that not-p 
. . . and so on back down the series until I hold contradictory beliefs. So I can only avoid both 
holding a self-falsifying belief and contradictory beliefs by mistakenly believing I hold a 
belief, thus failing the principle of introspective infallibility. Thus further iteration of (com1) 
does not diminish absurdity. For any iteration, the most charitable criticism to which I am 
vulnerable is that I am introspectively fallible. 
This result contradicts Sorensen’s claim that as iteration increases, the absurdity of omissive 
belief decreases. In fact, the decrease is only apparent. This appearance arises from an easily 
made confusion between the absurd belief that, for example,  
(om1000)  It is raining and I don’t believe that I believe that . . . I believe that it is 
raining 
and the non-absurd belief that 
It is raining but I don’t hold a one-thousandth-iterated belief that it is raining. 
This difference is explained by the principle that belief requires the ability of thought. 
Suppose that my beliefs are iterated in the following series: 
I believe that I believe that I believe that it is raining 
I believe that I believe that I believe that I believe that it is raining 
. . . and so on. 
Although I do not lose the concepts of rain, belief or of myself as the series progresses, 
eventually the sheer complexity of the iteration will prevent any human being from thinking 
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thoughts of it. If I hold a belief in (om1000) then in my case, this point is marked higher than 
the thousandth iteration of the belief and in that case I am open to the criticism that I fail to be 
introspectively omniscient. Conversely, if the point at which I am incapable of thinking the 
iterated thought is marked by the thousandth iteration of the belief then I cannot hold a belief 
in (om1000). But in that case I may justifi ably believe that 
It is raining but I don’t hold a one-thousandth-iterated belief that it is raining 
since I may sensibly recognize the fact that despite the rain, I cannot form beliefs of such 
complexity. Lacking the ability to hold such a belief does not prevent me from having the 
concept of it. Analogously, although I lack the ability to expand the series of positive integers 
forever, I have the concept of myself doing so. Or on looking at Escher’s lithograph of an 
impossible circular staircase that ascends forever, I may conceive of myself as completing a 
circle while continuously ascending the stairs, although I cannot have the ability to do so.36 
Moreover the abbreviated thought of a “one-thousandth-iterated belief” that we have just now 
formed in considering the series above is not particularly complex, as opposed to the thought 
that we would have formed in actually holding a one-thousandth iterated belief.37 
 
XI. WHY FURTHER ITERATION DOES NOT INCREASE ABSURDITY IN 
ASSERTION 
Suppose that you believe me when I assert 
(om1)   p and I don’t believe that I believe that p. 
Since you think me sincere in asserting the first conjunct, you believe that I believe that p. 
And since you believe what I say in the second conjunct, you believe that I don’t believe that 
I believe that p. So if you are to believe me, you must judge that I have a belief that I fail to 
recognize. Thus you may make only the minor criticism that I fail to be introspectively 
omniscient. Likewise if you believe me when I assert 
(com1)  p and I believe that I believe that not-p 
then since you think me sincere in asserting the first conjunct, you must believe that I believe 
that p. And since you believe what I say in the second conjunct, you must believe that I 
believe that I believe that not-p. So if you are to believe me, you must judge that I really hold 
a belief that p that contradicts what I think I believe (in other words, that I fail the principle of 
introspective infallibility unless I hold contradictory beliefs about whether p). Given your 
charity in withholding the judgment that I have contradictory beliefs, you may make only the 
minor criticism that I am introspectively fallible. In either case, you can only most charitably 
believe me if you think I’m not introspectively omniscient or not introspectively infallible. 
Subsequent iterations do not decrease the absurdity of omissive assertion. My assertion that 
It is raining but I don’t hold a one-thousandth-iterated belief that it is raining 
is perfectly credible, since neither you nor I can humanly hold such beliefs. My assertion may 
be a truthful report of a psychological limit. But this is not the assertion that  
(om1000)  It is raining and I don’t believe that I believe that . . . I believe that it is 
raining. 
To assert (om1000), I must be in a position to believe it, and so think the thought of it, in which 
case I am not subject to the same psychological limits. If you believe me when I assert it, then 
in virtue of thinking me sincere in asserting the first conjunct, you must think that I believe 
that it is raining. But in virtue of thinking that the second conjunct is true, you must also think 
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that I don’t believe that I believe that . . . I believe that it is raining. So you are in a position to 
see that at some point in the iteration I fail the first conjunct of the principle of introspective 
omniscience. 
Nor is my credibility in making commissive assertions strengthened by further iteration. Your 
judgment that I have a belief that contradicts what I take myself (over a thousand iterations) 
to believe should be that I am still at fault to the same degree. My iterated belief still commits 
me to a belief that is iterated one order less, and so on back down the series until I am 
committed to contradictory beliefs. If you believe me when I assert (com1000), you are still in 
a position to see that I can avoid contradictory beliefs only if, somewhere in the series, I take 
myself to have a belief that in fact, I don’t have.38 
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true. Similarly, when presented with the inscription, 
1 + 1 + 1 +1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1+ 1 + 1 is greater than 1 + 1 +1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 
I can sincerely assert, “That’s true” without having the thought that 10 is greater than 7. What I 
believe is that the inscription says something true, in virtue of believing that the number denoted by 
the left-hand side is greater than that denoted by the right-hand side. 
    A different sort of apparent counterexample arises when I seem to have only a partial grasp of the 
content of my belief. For example, mistakenly thinking that “arthritis” denotes an inflammation of 
bones as well as joints, I sincerely utter, “Arthritis has spread to my thigh.” Intuitively we feel that I 
mistakenly believe something to do with arthritis. The correctness of this intuition seems to contradict 
the principle. For since my inability to reliably distinguish cases of arthritis from other aliments 
precludes my grasp of the concept of arthritis embedded in would-be thoughts of arthritis, it follows 
that I can’t think any thoughts of arthritis. Thus, I cannot hold any beliefs about arthritis, in apparent 
contradiction of the intuition that I mistakenly believe something to do with arthritis. But even though 
I cannot hold beliefs about arthritis, I may still hold beliefs to do with arthritis. Surely what I do 
mistakenly believe is that inflammation of the joints and bones has spread to my thigh. Moreover I 
mistakenly believe that what others call “arthritis” has spread to my thigh. The principle does not 
prohibit these beliefs because I can think thoughts of inflamed joints and bones as well as thoughts of 
what others call “arthritis.” Since inflammation of the joints and bones and what others call “arthritis,” 
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stricter formulation of the fi rst condition of Moorean belief is that what is believed is possible by the 
believer’s own lights. 
21. For a different discussion of the importance of this point for accounts of Moorean assertion, see 
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25. Some would accept that assertion collects over conjunction as well. For example, Michael 
Dummett holds that “there is no significant contrast between a conjunction of assertions and an 
assertion of a conjunction.” See his Frege: Philosophy of Language, 2nd edition, (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1981), 336. But it does seem odd to count all the statements I have ever 
made as a single assertion, especially since pairs of them may well reflect repudiations of teenage 
opinions. 
26. See Uriah Kriegel, “Moore’s Paradox and the Structure of Conscious Belief,” Erkenntnis 61 
(2004), 100. 
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33. Since we frequently judge that some thinkers are more rational than others, the suggestion that 
there are degrees of rationality is appealing. It looks tricky to cash out however, especially in the 
currency of Sorensen’s principle. We might try to calculate the degree to which a believer is rational 
as the ratio of the number of the logical consequences of her beliefs that she accepts to the total of the 
logical consequences of her beliefs. One problem with this is that any belief that p has an infinity of 
logical consequences that p or r, that p or s, that p or t . . . . It follows that the degree of rationality of a 
person who only accepts a finite set of these is infinitesimally close to zero. This is surely too harsh a 
verdict. 
34. Uriah Kriegel suggested these formulations. 
35. A second referee pointed this out. 
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National Gallery of Art, Washington D.C. 
37. I have heard someone object that both “ I have a tenth-iterated belief that p” and “ I believe that I 
believe that I believe that I believe that I believe that I believe that I believe that I believe that I 
believe that I believe that I believe that p” are equally nonsensical. If this claim were true then it 
would be impossible for me to believe either of (om10) or (com10). For the grammatical negation of a 
piece of nonsense is also nonsense. Since “Blah is bleh” is nonsense, so is “Blah is not bleh.” So “I 
don’t believe that I believe that I believe that I believe that I believe that I believe that I believe that I 
believe that I believe that I believe that I believe that p” would also be nonsense. I cannot believe 
nonsense, as predicted by the principle that belief requires the ability of thought. But I see no reason 
to accept the claim. Certainly it is not true for lower iterations. “I think I’m an atheist,” is perfectly 
intelligible. So is, “I know for a fact that I think I’m an atheist.” The least the objector owes us is an 
explanation of why the alleged nonsensicality appears at higher levels. 
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